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STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) ON SENATE FLOOR ON
VITARELLI CASE, JUNE ¥ 1959.

Mr. President:
During the debate on the confirmation of Potter Stewart to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, I pointed out the dangers
inherent in recent decisions of the Supreme Court/concerning
Communists and Communist sympathizers.

I called attention to the

fact/that as a result of over-zealous and unwarranted concern/for
the purported rights of those who look with contempt on our
republican form of government, a series of recent decisions of the
Court has, in effect, written a
States.

11

Red Bill of Rights" in the United

As a result of these decisions, I am firmly convinced that

this country has immeasurably more to fear/from Communist subversion
within the United States/than it has from armed attack from the
Soviet Union.

To substantiate this conviction, I will refer to

only a few of the recent pronouncements/or the over-solicitous
Supreme Court.

In the Yates Case, the Court said that anyone may

advocate the forcible overthrow of our Government with impunity,
so long as it is in the abstract and there is no time set for overt
acts.

In the Cole and Service cases, it was held that Federal

employees may freely associate with Communists/without fear of
discharge/if they hold nonsensitive jobs.

Over the protests of

practically all of the States of the Union, and of the Attorney General
of the United States, the Supreme Court held invalid all State laws
concerned with sedition in Pennsylvania
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Nelson.

These are only

a few examples/or the Court's utter disregard of legislative intention
and attendance/to judicial

11

nit-p1cking".

Mr. President, on Monday of this week/the Supreme Court added
another amendment to the "Red Bill of Rights 11 /by ordering the
Interior Department/to reinstate an employee it had fired twice in
the last five years/on the ground that his continued employment was
contrary to the best interests of national security.

As a further

result of this decision, the Federal Government will be required
to pay $30,000 in back pay/to one who has been classified as a
11

security risk", who has been in sympathetic association with

Communists o'rCommunist sympathizers/and who the courts said had
lied about such associations before a Federal Loyalty-Security Board
inquiry.

And thus a Department of the Executive Branch of our

Government/is ordered by the Supreme Court/to reinstate an employee/
whom it has already determined is in such close association with
Communists or Communist sympathizers/that his continued employment
is inimical to the best interests of our country.

Judicial usurpation

of power by the present Court/2.s not confined to encroachments on the
legislative branch, but as Vitarelli v. Seaton so well attests, it
extends to the Executive Branch as well.

Mr. President, Government employees sought to be dismissed/
should be given the benefit of all procedural protections/required
by applicable statute and regulation.

Persons so situated should be

entitled to be free from dismissal/on unconstitutional or flagrantly
abusive grounds.

But no such dismissal occurred in the Vitarelli Case.

Vitarelli was at no time within the protection of the Civil Service
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Act, Veterans• Preference Act, or any other statute relating to
employment rights of Government employees.

This man who had been

classified as a "security risk 11/could have been sununarily discharged
by the Secretary of the Interior/at any time.

The Lloyd-LaFollette

Act/and the Veterans Preference Act--the general personnel laws-
authorize dismissals for "such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service 11 •

Thus there was no want of substantive authority

for the dismissal, and since Vitarelli was not in a "sensitive
position", he was not entitled to a hearing .before a Loyalty-Security
Boardo

The Supreme Court brazenly admitted that Vitarelli could have

been summarily discharged/had the Secretary of the Interior chosen
to do so.

It justified the order of reinstatement to the Department

of

or /and the payment of $30,000 /on the ground that

because theA

the grounds on which he

was being discharged--notification of which he was not entitled in
the first instance--the employee was entitled to all of the procedural
)

requirements of someone in a

11

sensitive 11 position.

Mr. President,

it is an impossibility to deprive a person of procedural due process/
unless he is entitled to it in the fir~t instance.

By its own

admission, the Supreme Court recognized that .Vitarelli was not
entitled to procedural due process/in this case.

The rationale by

which the Court reached the conclusion/that this security risk must
be afforded all of the procedural requirements of one in a sensitive ,
position/is typical of its rationalizations in other cases/dealing
with those who would overthrow our form of government.
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Lest there be any doubt that he was exercising his authority/
to summarily dismiss a subordinate in the Department of Interior,
the Secretary expunged the Department's records / or any reference to
the Communist activity of Mr. Vitarelli, and notified him of his
dismissal in October, 1956, omitting all reference to any statute,
order, or regulation relating to security discharge s.

There is no

question whatever, Mr. President, that the Secretary of the Interior
had the authority to summarily dismiss this employee, for whatever
cause he saw fit, and in a manner that saw him removed from the
ranks of Government employees / at the earliest possible opportunity.
However, the Supreme Court, in a marvelous display of judicial
gymnastics, held otherwise.

A

majority of the Court said /that

because the 1954 dismissal was abortive, no effect would be given

to the 1956 dismissal, notwithstanding the fa ct that ~·~A;;:;~=~
~ ~ ~ c : , 1 1 . , r \ ~ ..(J..>o.'
,
~
the letter ofAexercise of the Ls
ry dis ssal power.

Even i~ it

be conceded that the discharge of 1954 was invalid, the prior action
did not deprive the Secretary/ or the power to fire Vitarelli
prospectivelyo

It was a lawful exercise of the summary dismissal

power, and the Supreme Court held that it meant, administratively,
nothing.

The Court has frustrated every attempt of the Interior

Department /to rid itself of this undesired employee.

@

has a f ~ ~

has

On Monday of this week, the Supreme Court said that not only has
Vitarelli not been validly discharged, but that he is entitled to
back pay of $30,000.

How is the Federal Government to rid itself
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of subversive elements within its very ranks?
Typical of its opinions in recent years, Mr. President, the
Supreme Court has once again disregarded the actualities of the
situation.

The power of the Executive to discharge for

untrustworthiness or deliberate misrepresentation is beyond dispute.
The Secretary of the Interior had unfettered authority to summarily
dismiss William Vincent Vitarelli~ and did so, only to have this
authority frustrated by the Court.

In doing so, it gratuitously

transformed itself into a fact-finding body, criticising the
substance of the charges against Vitarelli / and the form of the
questions propounded at the security hearing.

It is not the function

of the Supreme Court/ to decide whether an employee is or is not
untrustworthy, or a "security risk".

Vitarelli v. Seaton is another

example of an unreal interpretation by the Supreme Court /resulting
in disproportionate concern for Communist sympathizers /and the
attribution of illegality to a lawful exercise of governmental
action.

-END-
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